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10, 11,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROSEMARY ABBOTT,
Plai/otiff-Appei 1<* ;t,
vs •
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,

Case No,

14,409

Defendants-Respondents

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for violation of Plaintiff-Appellant1s
rights created by the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures
Act, Sections 53-51-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
for breach of contract, and for violation of Plaintiff-Appellant!s
rights to due process.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court.

From a Judgment

and Order dismissing the Complaint, Plaintiff appeals.

1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and judgment
in her favor as a matter of law awarding her damages for her lost
salary and other benefits of employment and for an order reinstating
her as an employee of Respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant, Rosemary Abbott, was and is a teacher
holding a certificate to teach public schools in the State of
Utah.

Following a year of teaching in the State of Texas,

Appellant made application to Respondent for a teaching position
and was employed at the beginning of the 1973-74 school year to
teach one-half day of fifth grade at the Goshen Elementary School
and as an aid at the Santaquin Elementary School for the remainder
of the day.

In January, 1974, she was given a full time contract

of employment to teach fifth grade at the Goshen Elementary School.
Subsequently, she was given a contract of employment for the 1974-75
school year to again teach the fifth grade at Goshen Elementary
School.

Stipulated Facts R.20.
On March 27, 1975, the Respondent, through its Superintendent

Joe A. Reidhead, caused a letter to be delivered to Appellant which
informed her that she would not be offered a teaching contract for
the 1975-76 school year. A copy of that letter is attached hereto
as Appendix "A". Appendix "A" is the first and only notice Appellant
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received regarding the termination of her employment with Respondent.
The letter did not contain a written statement of causes or reasons
why Appellant would not be offered a teaching contract for the
1975-76 school year, or that Appellant could request an informal
conference before the Board of Education or such personnel as the
Respondent designated.

Thereafter, on at least two occasions,

Appellant requested from the Respondent a statement of the reasons
for her termination, but her requests were refused by Respondent.
Stipulated Facts R.20-21 and Appendix "A".
Following compliance with several steps of the grievance
procedure established by the Respondent, Appellant requested a
hearing before the Board of Education of the Nebo School District.
A hearing was set for May 13, 1975.

Prior to the date of the hearing,

Appellant requested that the Respondent make and provide her with
copies of material in her personnel file. The Respondent refused
to make such copies but advised Appellant that she could examine
her file. The Appellant, through her representatives, had requested
that Mr. William B. Stansfield, Principal at Goshen Elementary
School, and Appellantfs immediate supervisor, be present at the
hearing, but Respondent informed Mr. Stansfield that his presence
at the hearing would not be necessary.
attend the hearing.

Mr. Stansfield did not

Stipulated Facts R.21.

3
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Appellant appeared at the hearing in person and was also
represented by her legal counsel. At the hearing, Appellant's
legal counsel requested that the Board of Education specify its
reasons for not offering Appellant a contract of employment for
the 1975-76 school year.

In response, the Board of Education of

the Nebo School District, advised Appellant that it had no
obligation under its contract of employment with its educators and
that it was not the policy of the Board to provide a statement of
reasons why a "qualifying" educator would not be offered a teaching
contract for any ensuing year.

The Board took the position that

the only issues to be considered at the hearing would be her status
as a "qualifying" educator and whether or not she had been properly
and timely given notice that she would not be offered a teaching
contract for the 1975-76 school year as required by her contract.
Stipulated Facts R.21.

A document bearing the date of August 3, 1974, entitled
"An Agreement between the Board of Education of the Nebo School
District and the Nebo Education Association" (hereinafter "Agreement"),
contained the personnel and employment policies in effect for the
period August 3, 1974 through May 31, 1975, was duly negotiated
between the Respondent and its educators.

The Agreement was

incorporated by reference into the employment contract of the

4
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Appellant and all other educators employed by Respondent.

Pursuant

to the provisions of the Agreement, Appellant was during the time
of her employment with Respondent a "qualifying11 educator.
Stipulated Facts R.22.
Section 18-3-4 of the Agreement provides in relevant
part:
. . . the aggrieved party may request, through the
superintendent, a hearing before the Board. The
Board shall review the grievance at the earliest
possible Board meeting after receipt of the
request. The Board will act upon such request
with (within?) 40 calendar days. The Board may
grant, or refuse the grievance or may submit it
to arbitration. The Board's decision will be final.
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14.
Section 18-5-5 of the Agreement provides in relevant
part:
Prior to the Level Three hearings (Section 18-3-4
above), all parties of interest shall makeavailable
to the parties involved and their representatives,
all pertinent information not privileged under the
law, in their possession or control and which is
relevant to the issues raised by the grievance.
Plaintiff1 s Exhibit No. 14,
In the present case, the Respondent refused to state its
reasons for terminating the Appellant, refused to permit Mr. Stansfie
to be present at the hearing and refused to permit Appellant to
copy the contents of her personnel file or to provide copies to
Appellant's counsel.

Stipulated Facts R.21.
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Appendix f,Aff of the Agreement provides in relevant part:
I#

Procedures for Evaluation - Qualifying Educators.
1.
By January 15th of each year, the principal
will submit an evaluation of all qualifying
educators assigned to his school provided they
have been employed for at least two months.
2.
On April 1 of each year, the principal
will submit a second evaluation for:
a.
All qualifying educators whose stat s
has changed significantly since January.
b*
All educators whose evaluations were
"less than satisfactory" in January.
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14.

Evaluations of Appellant were conducted by January 15th
for the 1973-74 and 1974-75 school years, but no evaluation was
conducted by the principal (or anyone else) after the January, 1975
evaluation even though the principal knew that there would be a
change in Appellant's position.

T. 30.

See Appellantfs evaluations

attached hereto as Appendixes "B-l", "B-2" and "B-3ff.

The record

shows that Appellant's January, 1975 evaluation did not show
Appellant to be an educator whose performance was "less than
satisfactory11.
Section 7-1 of the Agreement provides:
Evaluations of an educator's performance based
on established district standards shall be
conducted in accordance with accepted professional
personnel practices. The educator will be fully
informed by the principal as to how such evaluation
shall be conducted.
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Section 7-2 of the Agreement provides:
Educators will be given a copy of any evaluation
report and will discuss such report with the
person preparing it before it is submitted to
the district office for inclusion in the educatorfs
permanent file. After such review, the educator
shall affix his signature to indicate that he is
aware of the contents of the report. Such
signature does not necessarily indicate agreement
with the content of such material.
In the present case, Mr. Stansfield testified that
Appellant was evaluated many times, but that she signed only three
evaluations and was not informed about the other evaluations. T. 31.
Further, Appellant was not evaluated after January, 1975. Even
then, Appellant's evaluations did not show her performance to be
less than satisfactory.

The formal evaluations of Appellant show

her to be a satisfactory teacher.
,f

See Appendixes

!l

B-lfl,

fl

B-2ff and

B~3n.
Section 5-6 of the Agreement provides:
Unless a contract of employment shall expressly
provide otherwise, a qualifying educator shall
be deemed to be employed for a period of one
school year. Each qualifying educator may deem
himself to be re-employed for the succeeding
year unless otherwise notified to the contrary
by the Board of Education in the manner hereinafter provided.
Appellant submits that as she was not notified or evaluated

in the manner required in the Agreement, she had both a ,fpropertyf?
interest and contractual right to be re-employed for the 1975-76
school year.

7
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Appellant submits that Respondent has an employment
practice of hiring and retaining its qualifying educators. The
following table* shows the number of qualifying educators hired
by the Respondent for its school years 1970-71 through 1974-75
together with the number of qualifying educators dismissed by the
Respondent for cause.
School Year

Teachers Hired

1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75

Teachers Dismissed
for Cause

46
59
39
42
48

1
0
1
2
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN FINDING THAT THE UTAH
ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION PROCEDURES ACT,
SECTIONS 53-51-1 ET SEQ., UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, AS AMENDED, DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.
Appellant submits that the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act, Sections 53-51-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended (hereinafter "Act"), governs the procedures which
Respondent must follow to terminate Appellant.

Respondent concedes

that it did not comply with the procedures required in the Act, but
argues that the Act does not apply in this case. Appellant submits
that the Act applies to her for two reasons: (1) the Act requires
^Compiled from the testimony of Joe A. Reidhead. T. 17 and 18.
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a fair hearing for all teachers (or educators) who are terminated
by a school district; and (2) Appellant had a "reasonable expectation
of continued employment in succeeding years/1
Section 53-51-2 of the Act provides:
The purpose of this act is to require school districts
to adopt orderly termination procedures and to specify
standards of due process and causes for termination.
Section 53-51-3 provides in relevant part:
As used in this act:
(2) "Dismissal11 or "termination" means:
(a) Any termination of the status of
employment of an educator.
(b) Failure to renew the employment contract
of an educator who pursuant to the employment
practices of the school district has a
reasonable expectation of continued employment in successive years.
(3) "Educator" or "teacher" means all teaching and
professional personnel of a school, district who
hold positions requiring certification and valid
certificates issued to them by the State Board
of Education.
Section 53-51-4 of the Act provides:
The board of education of each school district by
contract with its educators or their associations
or by resolution of the board shall establish
procedures for termination of educators in an
orderly manner without discrimination.

9
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Section 53-51-5 of the Act provides in relevant part that
"the orderly dismissal procedure adopted by a school district shall
provide: (1) Right to a fair hearing.11
Section 53-51-6 of the Act provides:
At all hearings, after due notice and demand of
the educator, he may be represented by counsel,
produce witnesses, hear the testimony against
him and cross-examine the witnesses and examine
documentary evidence. Hearings may be held before
the board or the board may establish a procedure
whereby hearing is before examiners . . . .
Appellant was a teacher employed by the Respondent.
Respondent determined not to renew Appellant's contract of employment
for the 1975-76 school year and so advised her.

In response to

Respondent's notification to her, Appellant requested a hearing
before the Board of Education of Respondent.

The Board set a

time on its regular agenda to hear Appellant, but Respondent
failed and refused both at the hearing and prior thereto to
provide Appellant with a statement of its reasons for not
renewing Appellant's contract of employment.

It further refused

to permit Mr. William Stansfield, Appellant's Principal
and immediate supervisor, to be present at the hearing, and
thereby effectively denied Appellant the opportunity to "hear the
testimony against . . • (her) and to cross-examine witnesses and
examine documentary evidence."

Respondent also refused to produce
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and permit Appellant to copy documents contained in her personnel
file.
Appellant submits that Respondent's actions, as above
stated, denied her minimal due process required by Sections 53-51-5(1)
and 53-51-6 of the Act.
Appellant submits that the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act requires that she be given a fair hearing, if requested
by her, as a condition precedent to her termination by Respondent. At
the hearing, Appellant is entitled to hear the testimony against her,
to cross-examine witnesses, to examine documentary evidence and
to know the reasons for her termination. As the Respondent failed
to afford the Appellant a fair hearing, Appellant is entitled to
the relief she seeks.
Secondly, Appellant submits that the Act creates a
second category of teachers who are entitled to more than the
minimal due process required by Sections 53-51-5(1) and 53-51-6.
Section 53-51-5 of the Act provides in relevant part:
(2) If the district intends not to renew (the)
contract of employment of an individual entitled
to employment in succeeding years according to the
district personnel program, notice of such
intention shall be given the individual. Said
notice shall be issued at least two months before
the end of the contract term of the individual,
e.g., the school year. The notice in writing shall
be served by personal delivery or by certified mail
addressed to the individuals last known address.
Notice shall be dated and contain a clear and
concise statement that the individual's contract
will not be renewed for an ensuing term and the
reasons
for the termination. (Emphasis added.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(3) In the absence of timely notice, a subparagraph
(2) employee is deemed to be re-employed for the
succeeding contract term with a salary based upon
the salary schedule applicable to the class of
employee into which the individual falls. This
provision shall not be construed to preclude the
dismissal of an employee during his contract term
for cause.
(4) At least one month prior to issuing notice
of intent not to renew the contract of the
individual, he shall be informed of the fact that
continued employment is in question and the reasons
therefor and given an opportunity to correct the
defects which precipitated possible nonrenewal.
The individual may be granted assistance in his
efforts to make correction of the deficiencies
which may include informal conferences and the
services of applicable school personnel within
the district.
Appellant submits that the employment practices of
Respondent created a reasonable expectation of continued employment
for all teachers hired by it. The testimony of Joe A. Reidhead,*
Superintendent of Respondent, showed that only 2.1% of all teachers
hired by Respondent from the 1970-71 through 1974-75 school years
were terminated.

Furthermore, the Respondent's Agreement

provides that "qualifying educators" would be evaluated by
January 15th of each year. A copy of Appellant's evaluations
are attached hereto as Appendixes "B-l", "B-2 M and "B-3".

*Table above at page 8.

12
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Those

evaluations show that Appellant was an average
teacher employed by the District.

It should be noted that her

first evaluation dated April 30, 1973, showed Appellant to be
below average in three categories.

Her second evaluation dated

February 8, 1974 showed her to be an average teacher and her
third and last evaluation dated January, 1975 showed her to be
below average in only one category.
Appendix

fl ,!

A

of Respondent's Agreement, set forth above,

provides that educators are to be evaluated during January of each
year.

Educators whose status has changed, are to be evaluated

in "April" of each year.

It is admitted by the Respondent that

it did not perform the second evaluation in April of 1975 as it
should have done pursuant to the terms of its Agreement. T.30.

13
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In Sigmon v. Poe« 381 F. Supp. 387 at p. 392 (D.C.N.C.
1974) the court held:
The defendant, Board of Education, had a practice
and the Superintendent issued a directive requiring
principals in the fall of the year to report teachers
whom they intended to rate as unsatisfactory, and to
n
be sure that each employee in your school . . . is
aware that he or she may make a written response to
the complaints, commendations and suggestions.u This
was not done. Mr. Jaynes1 (the defendant's principal)
adverse report of October, 1973, in furtherance of his
decision not to renew plaintiff's contract, was a
secret report never communicated to the plaintiff
until late the following spring. The plaintiff had
an interest under established procedures in knowing
of this adverse action, and the secret report by the
principal was a violation of her right to have that
knowledge. This B a violation of a property right
which entitles her to a due process hearing.
In the instant case, the Respondent, through its Agreement,
had agreed with its employees that if evaluations of its educators
would be based on established district standards and that the
educator would be fully informed by the principal as to how such
evaluations were to be conducted.

The educators were to be given

a copy of the evaluation report and an opportunity to discuss the
report with the person preparing it before it was submitted to
the district office.

The district's Agreement also required the

educator to sign the report as an indication that he is aware of
the contents of the report. Article 7-1 and 7-2 of the Agreement
(text set forth at pp. 6 and 7 above)•
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Appendix lfAfl of the Agreement also requires that the
principal submit a second evaluation on April 1st of each year
for:
a.
All qualifying educators whose status has
changed significantly since January.
b.
All educators whose evaluations were "less
than satisfactory11 in January.
In the instant case, no such evaluation was prepared or
submitted.

Accordingly, pursuant to the criteria of the Sigmon

case, supra, Appellant had a property right and reasonable expectation
of continued employment, at least through the following school year.
Accord, Francis v. Ota, 356 F. Supp. 1029 at pp. 1033-1034
(D.Haw. 1973), where the court held that a non-tenured guidance
counselor and registrar at a community college had a legitimate
expectation of continued employment unless and until the administration
deprived him of that expectation in a manner consistent with its
established procedures and policies.
Appellant submits that, based upon the employment practices
and policies of the Respondent, she had a reasonable expectation of
continued employment on either of the following grounds:
A.

Respondent did not evaluate Appellant's performance

in the manner required of it by its own Agreement and it
failed to perform the second evaluation by April 1st as
required by Appendix nAlf of the Agreement, or
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Respondent terminates only approximately 2.1% of

its probationary teachers.
Because Respondent has created in Appellant a reasonable
expectation of continued employment, Respondent must comply with the
requirements of subsections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 53-51-5 of
the Act.

It is admitted by Respondent that it has not complied

with the provisions of the Act.
Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to the relief which
she requests.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT
WAS NOT IN BREACH OF THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT
WITH APPELLANT (THE AGREEMENT).
Appellant submits that Respondent is in breach of its
Agreement with Appellant for the reasons that it:
(a) Terminated her without affording her a fair hearing;
(b) Failed and refused to provide her with pertinent
information in its possession and control;
(c) Failed to conduct the evaluations of Appellant
in the manner required of it by the Agreement; and
(d) Failed and refused to comply with the Agreement
with respect to conducting evaluations of Appellant.

16
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In Point I above, Appellant has set forth her arguments
with respect to Respondent's failure to follow the provisions of
the Agreement with respect to the method for conducting evaluations
of her performance.

The record clearly shows that Respondent did

not comply with Sections 7-1 and 7-2 of the Agreement.
Respondent comply with the provisions of Appendix

ff fl

A

Nor did the

of the

Agreement.
Section 18-5-5 of the Agreement requires Respondent to
make available to Appellant and her representatives "all pertinent
information not privileged under law, in their possession or control
and which is relevant to the issues raised by the grievance.11

It

is admitted that the Respondent refused to permit Appellant to
make copies of the information contained in her file, although it
did permit her to look at the file. Appellant had also requested
that Mr. Stansfield, Appellant's principal and supervisor, attend
the hearing, but Respondent directed Mr. Stansfield not to attend
the meeting.
As Respondent is in breach of its Agreement with Appellant,
Respondent should be ordered to pay Appellant damages and to
reinstate her until such time as it complies with the terms of the
Agreement.

17
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT
HAD NO PROPERTY RIGHT TO BE PROTECTED BY
DUE PROCESS.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States provides that no state shall . . . "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or of property, without due process of
law . . • ."
Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Appellant submits that both the law and facts set forth
in Points I and II above, afford Appellant a property rirht of which
she may not be deprived without due process of law.
In Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2ci 314 (1945),
this court held that the essential elements of due process are:
(a) The existence of a competent person, body, or
agenc}r authorized by law to determine the question;
(b) An inquiry into the merits of the question by
such person, body or agency;
(c) Notice to the person of the inauguration and
purpose of the inquiry and the time at which such
person should appear if he wishes to be heard;

18
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(d) Right to appear in person or by counsel;
(e) Fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine
and cross-examine witnesses; and
(f)

Judgment to be rendered on the record thus made.

In the case of the Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), Mr. Roth, an untenured teacher employed
by Wisconsin State University, sought an order of the Federal Courts
enjoining the University from terminating his employment for the
reason that he had requested and had been denied a statement of the
reasons for the University!s decision not to rehire him for another
year.

Mr. Roth had also requested and had been denied a hearing

regarding his termination.

The Court held that absent a showing

by the Plaintiff of a "property" or "liberty" interest, the University
need not provide Mr. Roth a statement of its reasons for not renewing
his contract or to afford him an opportunity for a hearing.

In

the Roth case, supra, the Court set forth certain standards relevant
to this case. The Court held:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a
person clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He must have more than
a unilateral expectation of it. Hamust,
instead, have a ligitimate claim of entitlement
to it. It is the purpose of the ancient institution
of property to protect those claims upon which
people rely in their daily lives, reliance that
must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a
purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing
to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate
those claims.
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Property interests, of course, are not created by
the Constitution. Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law -- rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits.
408 U.S. 577.
In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the court
was concerned with a college teacher employed in a state college
system under a series of one year contracts for a period of ten
years.

Following the 1968-69 school year,

the governing board

voted not to offer him a new contract for the following year.

He

was given no reason for the nonrenewal of his contract nor with an
opportunity to challenge any basis for the nonrenewal.

Using the

criteria developed in Roth, supra, the court found that Mr. Sindermann
had a property interest to be protected by due process.
held:
A written contract with an explicit tenure
provision clearly is evidence of a formal
understanding that supports a teacher's
claim of entitlement to continued employment
unless sufficient "cause" is shown. Yet,
absence of such an explicit contractual
provision may not always foreclose the
possibility that a teacher has a "property"
interest in re-employment . . . .
Explicit
contractual provisions may be supplemented
by other agreements implied from "the
promisors words and conduct in light of the
surrounding circumstances . . . and (t)he
meaning of (t)he promisors words and acts
is found by relating them to the usage of
the past. 408 U.S. 601-602.
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on

The court

In the instant case, the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act requires that Respondent give Appellant a "fair
hearing" and a statement of reasons for the nonrenewal of her
contract of employment.

The Act sets forth the elements of a fair

hearing with which Respondent must comply.
Appellant further submits that even if the Utah Orderly
School Termination Procedures Act does not apply in this case, she
had a protected property interest because of the policies and practice*
of the Respondent with respect to:
A,

Respondents duties to evaluate Appellant's

performance as an educator, which evaluations were not
conducted in the manner required by the provisions of the
Agreement.

In Francis v. Ota, 356 F. Supp. 1029 at pp.

1033-1034 (D.C.Haw. 1973), the court held that the failure of
the college to follow its own established procedures created
in the school teacher a "legitimate expectation of future
employment."
B*

Respondent's practice of renewing the employment

of its probationary teachers. Accord, Lusk v. Estes, 361
F. Supp. 653 (N.D.Tex. 1973), wherein the court held that
a teacher had a "property" interest where he was justified
in expecting continued employment in light of the practices
and policies of the school.
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Appellant submits that she had a protected propertyinterest for the reasons suggested in Points I and II of this Brief.
The foregoing decisions of the courts of the United States show
that she had been denied the due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Appellant urges this Court to find that she has also been
denied due process under Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution
of Utah.

See Untermeyer v. State Tax Commission, 102 Utah 214,

129 P.2d 881 (1942), wherein this court held that the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court are highly persuasive as to the
application of Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah.
Even if this Court finds that the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act is not applicable to Appellant, nevertheless,
Appellant is entitled to due process because of the Respondent's
failure to comply with its own Agreement and because of the practices
and policies of the Respondent.

Appellant suggests that the elements

of due process which should be afforded her are found in Christiansen
v. Harris, supra.
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It is respectfully submitted that the Utah Orderly
School Termination Procedures Act and the policies and practices
of the Respondent have created in the Appellant a protected
"property" interest which requires due process before Respondent
may lawfully terminate Appellantfs employment.

Until such time

as she is afforded the due process, Appellant should be awarded
damages for loss of salary and Respondent should be ordered to
reinstate Appellant as a teacher and educator at a salary
together with such benefits as she would have had had she not
been improperly terminated by Respondent.

CONCLUSIONS
1.

The Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act,

Sections 53-51-1 et seq., 1953, as amended, requires the Respondent
School District to provide in its policies for orderly termination
of its teachers, an opportunity for a fair hearing.

The elements

of the fair hearing are set forth at Section 53-51-6, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.

Respondent has failed to comply with

the hearing requirements of that Act.
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2.

Appellant had a ''reasonable expectation of continued

employment" within the meaning of the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act, supra, for the reasons that:
(a) Only 2.170 of all teachers hired by the Respondent
from the 1970-71 through 1974-75 school years were terminated.
(b) Respondent's evaluations of Appellant showed her
to be an average teacher.

The Agreement required Respondent

to evaluate Appellant, if it were determined that her status
had changed, by April 1, 1975. That evaluation was never
performed.

Many of the "informal" evaluations of the

Appellant were done in secret and without Appellant's
knowledge contrary to the requirements of Respondent's
Agreement with Appellant.
3.

Respondent breached its Agreement with Appellant

in that it:
(a) Terminated Appellant without affording her a
fair hearing,
(b) Failed and refused to provide Appellant with
pertinent information in its possession and control which
Appellant considered relevant to her case,
(c) Failed to conduct the evaluations of Appellant in
the manner required of it by the Agreement, and
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(d) Failed and refused to comply with the provisions of
the Agreement with respect to conducting the evaluations of
Appellantfs performance as a teacher•
4.

The Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act,

supra, and the Agreement created in the Appellant a "property11 right
of which the Appellant may not be deprived without due process of
law under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 7 of the
Constitution of Utah.
5.

Appellant should be awarded damages for her lost

salary and other benefits and reinstated as a teacher employed
by Respondent until such time as she is afforded due process by
Respondent.

Respectfully submitted,

yj/fVltf
MICHAEL T. McCOY
414 Walker Bank Building

Salt Lake City, tJtah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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1/

D I S T R I C T

March 27, 1975

Ms. Rosemary S. Abbott
40 North 800 East
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
Dear M s . Abbott:
Pursuant to an Agreement between the Nebo Board of Education
and the Nebo Education Association, and according to Article 5 - 6 ,
I am hereby notifying you on this 27th day of March, 1975, that you
will not be offered a teaching contract for the coming school year of
1975-76.
Sincerely yours,

c CT. ^^<
Joe A, Reidhead
Superintendent
JAR/cb
cc: Principal Boyd Stansfield
Nebo Education Association
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